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Available online xxxxExisting political economy models of pensions focus on age and productivity. In this paper we
incorporate two additional individual characteristics: sex andmarital status. We ignore the role
of age, by assuming that people vote at the start of their life, and characterize the preferred rate
of taxation that finances a Beveridgean pension scheme when individuals differ in wage, sex
and marital status. We allow for two types of couples: one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner
couples. Marriage pools both wage and longevity differences between men and women. Hence
singles tend to have more extreme preferred tax rates than couples. We show that the majority
voting outcome depends on the relative number of one-breadwinner couples and on the size of
derived pension rights.








Individualisation of pension rights1. Introduction
Most pension schemes provide beneﬁts that are longevity-invariant and sometimes contribution-invariant. Given that men
have a shorter life expectancy than women and earn, and thus contribute, more, it is clear that such pension systems are to their
detriment. So why do men consistently agree with pension schemes that penalize them? The ﬁrst answer one can offer is that
women outnumber men and can impose their views. Another possible reason is that, with ﬂat-rate beneﬁts, low-incomemenmay
support such schemes if earnings differences dominate longevity differences. Yet the best alternative explanationmight be that, in
a society where a majority of men and women are married, longevity and earnings differences are pooled within the couple and
this makes any sex war irrelevant.
Women live longer than men and they earn less than men on average. For instance, in France, it is estimated that women life
expectancy at 60 is 20% higher than that of a man and that the pay gap is around 20%. At the same time, there is evidence that low-
income people, men and women, have lower longevity than high-income people. This has led to studies that show that social
security schemes that look redistributive, but provide longevity-invariant beneﬁts, are in fact not so redistributive (see e.g.
Coronado et al., 2000; Liebman, 2001, and Bommier et al., 2006). For example, Bommier et al. (2006) estimate that the
redistribution in the French public pension system is reduced by up to 50% because of this longevity invariance.
Social Security redistribution by marital status is also surprisingly large. For instance, Galasso (2002) shows that one-earner
couples get the highest internal return from the Social Security, followed by two-earner couples with 70/30 earnings split; returns
are equal for two-earner couples with a 50/50 earnings split and single women, while single men are the most disadvantaged. The+32 10 474301.
(M.-L. Leroux).
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2 M.-L. Leroux et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2010) xxx–xxxdifference in returns observed between singles and married couples, either one-earner or two-earner, can be explained by the so-
called “derived pension rights”. Several countries, like France, provide the surviving spouse (more often the woman) with a
survivor beneﬁt, while some other countries provide one-earner couples with a higher replacement rate than the one applied to
single men; some countries, like Belgium or Japan, provide both types of derived beneﬁts.1 Themarital status and the generosity of
the system towards the non-working spouse are then likely to play an important role in the support for a pension system.
A number of political economy papers have attempted to explain existing pension systems using majority voting models.2 In
his seminal contribution, Browning (1975) focused on age differences and showed that, if the old favour generous pensions and
the young prefer private savings, the decisive voter is the median age one. More recent models include wage differences alongside
age differences. In such a framework, Casamatta et al. (2000) show that the pension system is chosen by a majority made of rich
and poor workers who collude against a coalition of retirees and middle class workers: this is the so-called ends against the middle
outcome.
In this paper we concentrate on two additional individual characteristics: sex and marital status. We characterize the pension
scheme that is chosen by majority voting in a society where men live shorter and earn more than women, and most men and
women are married. Assuming that retirement consumption is ﬁnanced by the returns of private savings and a Beveridgean
pension beneﬁt, we explore several issues: i) the effect of longevity andwage gender gaps on the chosen tax rate, ii) the effect of an
increase in the number of married couples on the size of the pension system, iii) the effect of an increase in the relative number of
one-breadwinner (versus two-breadwinner) couples on the pension system, and iv) the effect of the individualization of pension
rights (equivalently, the reduction of derived pension rights) on the size of the chosen tax rate.
These issues are certainly relevant for prevailing pension systems and, surprisingly, have hardly been addressed in the
literature.3 In particular, the generosity of the system towards non-working spouses may play an important role in the political
support of one-breadwinner couples towards existing pension systems.4 This is a timely topic to address. Indeed, women are
increasingly participating in the labour force and pension systems are increasingly individualized. More and more countries are
abandoning the “derived pension rights model” and adopting instead the so-called “adult worker model”. For example, Denmark
has suppressed survivor beneﬁts and Germany has moved towards a “family splitting” system, which also provides a
compensation for interrupted careers (for example, a pension credit per child).5 One can thus expect that this dual evolution (i.e.
increased labour participation by women and individualization of pension rights) will have some incidence on the size of the
pension system.
The setting we adopt is standard. People live for two periods, the second one being of variable length. They work in the ﬁrst
period and retire in the second one. The retirement consumption depends on the amount of private savings but also on the pension
beneﬁt, which is chosen through voting. Finally, the pension system is Beveridgean so that pension beneﬁts and payroll tax rates
are uniform. Individuals vote at the beginning of their life. To keep the analysis tractable, we make a number of simplifying
assumptions like, for instance, a quasi-linear utility function, no liquidity constraints and certain length of life. All men have the
same longevity, which is lower than that of women. Men andwomen have the same productivity, but the wage of women is only a
ﬁxed fraction of that of men. Later in the paper, we discuss the implications of assuming a continuous productivity distribution
instead. We further assume that the number of singles and of couples with one or two earners is exogenously given. 6 In this
model, there is also positive assortative mating (i.e. men marry women who have the same underlying productivity but earn a
given fraction of their wage).7
In this framework, lower productivity and higher longevity individuals beneﬁt from the existence of a pension scheme. Thus,
single women, who have lower wages and longer lives, will be in favour of a pension scheme while single men, who have higher
wages and shorter lives, will be against it. We then explore the role of couples. We ﬁrst consider two-breadwinner couples only. In
this case gender differences in wages and longevity are neutralized so that the couple gets a zero net beneﬁt from the pension
system. They are hence indifferent between public pensions and private savings as a mean of smoothing consumption between
periods. However, because labour supply is endogenous in our setting, a pension system creates labour supply distortions and that
they end up preferring a zero tax rate. Finally we account for the existence of one-breadwinner couples, alongside singles and two-
breadwinner couples, and introduce derived pension rights. One-breadwinner couples do not neutralize gender differences and
they will be in favour of a generous pension system when derived pension rights are important and sufﬁcient to outweigh the
husband's net contribution to the pension system. We show that the support for a pension system depends on the relative
proportions of different types of households, and on the size of the derived pension rights. We further extend our model to allow
for a continuous productivity distribution. Our results are robust to this new speciﬁcation. The only difference is that now, for each1 For example, in Belgium, the supplementary pension is evaluated to 1/4 of the working spouse pension. As shown in Gruber and Wise (1999), derived
pension rights may take very different forms depending on the country.
2 For good surveys, see Galasso and Profeta (2002) and de Walque (2005).
3 See however Borck (2007) and Leroux (2010) who have introduced longevity differentials in political economy models of social security.
4 For a good survey on the role of derived pension rights on old-age income security of women in OECD countries, see Choi (2006).
5 On this, see Choi (2006), Veil (2007) and Bonnet and Geraci (2009).
6 This is certainly not what is observed in reality. For instance, the introduction of a pension system, providing or not derived rights may modify the marital
structure of the society and may also inﬂuence the women's labour participation decision. For instance, in Leroux and Pestieau (2010), it depends on the features
of pension systems.
7 The papers of Mare (1991), Pencavel (1998) and Qian (1998) ﬁnd strong evidence of positive assortative mating with respect to education. Education can be
regarded as a good proxy for income.
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system due to the amount of income redistribution they obtain.
Finally, our model suggests that the recent trend towards the individualization of pension rights should lead to reduced payroll
tax levels. Our model however does not provide clear results regarding the effect of an increase in the proportion of two-
breadwinner couples, where an increase or decrease in the preferred tax rate are both possible depending on the generosity of the
system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a standard political economy model where individuals differ in
wages and longevity. Section 3 introduces gender and marriage. In Section 4 we allow for productivity differences and in the last
section we discuss the assumptions made in our model and some possible extensions.
2. The basic model
We assume that individuals live for two periods.8 They work in the ﬁrst period and retire in the second one. Each individual of
type i is characterized by a pair (wi,πi), where wi is the labour productivity in the ﬁrst period and πi is the length of the second
period of life.9










(201ui ci;di; lið Þ = ci−v lið Þ + πiu dið Þ;
ci and di denote the ﬁrst- and second-period consumptions, respectively, and li the is labour supply. Second-period utilitywhere
function u(.) is such that u′(.)N0 and u′′(.)b0. For simplicity, we assume that the disutility of labour v(li) is quadratic and equal to
li
2/2. Individuals work, contribute to the pension system, consume and save in the ﬁrst period. In the second period, they retire and
receive a pension beneﬁt p. We also assume a perfect annuitymarket and a zero interest rate so that the return on savings is simply





τ∈ [0,1] is the payroll tax rate and si is the amount of savings.10where
Throughout the paper, we assume away liquidity constraints so that si can be positive as well as negative.11 The problem of type




i = 2 + πiu dið Þ
s:t:
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+ pFrom the ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain:li = 1−τð Þwi;
u′ dið Þ = 1:As to the pension beneﬁt, we assume that individuals contribute to the pension system during the ﬁrst period of their life and




ni denotes the relative number of individuals of type i. Note that here p is an annual pension beneﬁt, which implies that aapproach is static but our model can equivalently be seen as the steady state of an open economy OLG model.
lternative would be to allow for uncertain mortality, πi being then the probability of surviving to the second period. We believe that it would not modify
tially our conclusions but would complicate the presentation.
e that second-period consumption di and, accordingly, its components (i.e. the private annuity and the pension beneﬁt) represent instant ﬂows during a
f unequal length πi.
er this assumption, we allow for negative ﬁrst-period consumption. This simpliﬁes our results without changing them qualitatively.
uming a pension beneﬁt that would be partially contributive would not change the nature of the results but would complicate the analysis.




Fig. 1. Separating locus of types for and against a positive payroll tax.
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E[w2] is the average square wage and π is the average length of the second period.13 Every individual contributes anwhere
amount that is proportional to his labour income and receives a uniform pension beneﬁt during a retirement period of unequal
length πi. Such a pension system redistributes resources from high-productivity to low-productivity individuals and from short-
lived to long-lived individuals.14






+ p τð Þ
 
; ð2Þ
the star stands for theoptimal level. Thepreferred tax rate of this individual is obtainedby solving the followingprogram:
max
τ∈ 0;1½ 



























ð3ÞThe preferred tax rate of an individual depends on the level of redistribution he expects to get from the pension system. Hemay
beneﬁt from the pension system either because of a longer life and/or of a lower productivity than the average. Hence, the
preferred tax rate of any individual will be zero if he has characteristics such that w2i = πi ⩾ E w2
 
= π. It is clear that the lower the
wage rate and the higher the longevity the more likely an individual will be in favour of the pension scheme. The equality
w2i = πi = E w
2
 
= π gives the separating locus of types for and against a positive payroll tax and, thus, a public pension scheme. In
Fig. 1, we represent this function in the plane (wi,πi).
To the left of the curve, the (wi,πi)-types are in favour of a positive tax; to the right, they are against. It is also worth noticing
that, when positive, the most preferred tax rate decreases with wi and increases with πi.e that in this section the terms “wage” and “productivity” can be used interchangeably. This will not be the case in subsequent sections and we use then
t notation to distinguish them.
st PAYG pension schemes exhibit such features. On this topic see, for example, Coronado et al. (2000), Liebman (2001) and Bommier et al. (2006).
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taxation: 1/2 is the tax that provides the maximum revenue (i.e. the peak of the Laffer curve).
The determination of the political equilibrium when voters differ in more than one characteristic is known to be more
complex.15 We address this below by assuming a particular relationship between the characteristics wi and πi.
3. Model with unique productivity level
We now assume that individuals differ in gender. We consider ﬁrst a society consisting only of singles, and introduce later the
possibility of marriage. We also allow couples to comprise either one breadwinner or two breadwinners.
We assume that there is a mass 1 of men as well as of women. These are characterized by a pair (πm,ωm) for men and a pair









(201πm = π; ωm = w;
πf = βπ; ωf = αw;
ωi represents the wage, which might differ from productivity w for women. We assume that α≤1 and β≥1.16 In otherwhere
words, we posit that women have a longer life than men but obtain a lower wage. Note that, in this section, we assume a unique




1 + βð Þπ ; ð4Þ
he average expected wage is now (1+α2)w2/2 and the average longevity is π= 1 + βð Þπ= 2.3.1. The political equilibrium in a society of singles
Under our assumptions of different wage and longevity for different genders, using Eq. (3), we have that the preferred tax rates







1 + βð Þπ ;







1 + βð Þπ :
an, who has lower longevity and higher productivity than the average, always prefers a zero tax rate since he is a netA m
contributor to the pension system. On the contrary, a woman always gets a net beneﬁt from the pension system and votes for a
positive tax rateτf =
β−α2
β−α2 + β 1 + α2
 	 N 0:The political equilibrium corresponds to the preferred tax rate of the median individual. For instance, if the number of women
was slightly higher than the number of men, the political outcome in a society composed by singles only would be the preferred
tax rate of women:τ = τf ⋅3.2. The political equilibrium in a society with both singles and couples
We now study the labour and consumption decisions made by a couple. Note that we do not consider endogenous marriage
even if, obviously, some single individuals may gain from forming a couple. Indeed, given the quasi-linear speciﬁcation, the utility
of a couple is the same as the sum of utilities of a single man and a single woman with the same productivity. From a laissez-faire
perspective, marriage creates a welfare gain for the woman and a loss for the man, which is reduced when there is a pensiondetermination of the equilibrium when preferences are single-peaked and individuals differ in a single characteristic is relatively simpler. For instance, if
iduals had the same longevity πi = π, the equilibrium tax rate would depend on the productivity distribution. Assume for example a standard density




N w. Given that in the relevant range of w, the most
d tax rate decreases with w, the Condorcet winner is the tax rate preferred by the individuals with median wage.
simplicity, we restrict attention to the most realistic case where α≤1 and β≥1 but the analysis could be extended to αN1 and βb1. We do not explore in
er why women have a lower wage. We simply account for the empirical fact that women, on average, have a lower wage than men.
ection 4, we relax this assumption to allow for a continuous productivity distribution.
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complicate the model without changing our qualitative results.18 Additionally, in this paper we adopt the unitary model of the
household (i.e. a model where the household has only one set of preferences).19 Under such a speciﬁcation, spouses play
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+ πf + πm
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d represents the individual level of (annual) consumption in the second period for each member of the couple. The labourwhere
supply of the husband and that of the wife are, respectively, lm =w(1−τ) and lf=αw(1−τ). Note that, under our assumptions,
these are independent of their marital status (i.e. whether they belong to a couple or are single). Hence, the labour supply of a
woman is always lower than that of a man. This implies that her total contribution to the pension scheme, αwτ, is also lower while
she receives a higher total pension beneﬁt, βπp≥πp.





w2 + 1 + βð Þπ u d 	−d + p τð Þ ; ð5Þ
the superscript c2 stands for a couple with two breadwinners and d is the optimal level of second-period consumption.20where
The equation of the pension beneﬁt (Eq. (4)) is not modiﬁed by the introduction of two-breadwinner couples since both members
contribute to, and beneﬁt from, the pension scheme in the same way as if they were singles. Differentiating this indirect utility
function with respect to the tax rate τ, it is straightforward to show that the preferred tax rate of a two-breadwinner couple is
always nil, τc2 =0. Note that, if labour supply were exogenous, the couple would be indifferent between any level of taxation (it
would obtain the same return from savings as from the pension scheme). When labour supply is endogenous, the preferred tax
rate is zero since, in this case, the pension scheme introduces distortions on the labour supply (i.e. the individual return from the
pension scheme is smaller than the return from private savings).
We now consider the political equilibrium and assume that a fractionφ of men andwomen aremarried. The preferred tax rates
for single women and men remain the same, since the existence of couples does not modify the expression of the pension beneﬁt,
so that τm =0 and τfN0 (as shown before) while τc2 =0. With equal number of women and men, as soon as some of them are
married there is a majority of individuals who favour a zero tax rate and the political outcome will be τ=0.21
3.3. Introducing one-breadwinner couples
3.3.1. The modiﬁed model
Let us now assume that society consists of four different categories of households: single men, single women, couples with two
breadwinners and couples with one breadwinner. As in the previous sections, there is still an equal fraction (1−φ) of single males
and of single females and a fractionφ of couples, so that a number 2φ of individuals live in couple. But we now assume that, among
these couples, a fraction μ is composed of two breadwinners, while a fraction (1−μ) of couples consists of only one breadwinner.22
The earner is always the husband.23 His wife may be entitled to a pension beneﬁt in the retirement period even if she did not
personally contribute to the pension scheme. These beneﬁts, sometimes called derived pension rights, consist of a small
supplementary pension plus a survival pension. We thus assume that she receives a fraction γ∈ [0,1] of the full annual pension
beneﬁt p(τ) during the second period of her life of length πf.24 If γ=0 the spouse receives nothing in the second period while if
γ=1 she gets a full pension.25 Whatever the value of γ, annual consumption is the same for both spouses.quilibrium, the pension beneﬁt depends on the structure of the society (through the government budget constraint), which itself depends on the pension
ters. This phenomenon is exacerbated with the introduction of one-breadwinner couples and derived rights. For simplicity, we assume that the number of
individuals is exogenous. Although very interesting, we believe that endogenizing marriage is outside the scope of the paper and we left this for future
umber of alternatives have been recently suggested, ranging from bargaining to non-cooperative models. Our choice is mainly guided by the concern for
ity.
quasi-linearity of ﬁrst period consumption implies that we assume away income effects on d and l.
e labour supply were exogenous, the couple would be indifferent between any level of taxation and we would then have had exactly the reverse result,
aximum tax rate τ=τf=1, under the assumption of a slightly higher number of women than of men.
e that Section 3.1 is equivalent to assuming φ=0, while Section 3.2 corresponds to φ∈ [0,1] and μ=1.
to now, the total lifetime income was Y=w2(1+α2), normalizing the size of the population to 2. With a fraction φ(1−μ) of the population as one-
inner couples, this amount decreases to Y′=w2[1+α2(1−φ(1−μ))].
parameter γ may account either for a survivor beneﬁt or for the higher replacement rate provided to a one-earner couple than to a single individual. As
ed in the introduction, such features are observed in many countries with a public pension scheme.
e that we assume that γ is exogenously ﬁxed while, in reality, it is certainly a political choice variable. In the present paper we make this assumption in
simplify our computations and to focus on the inﬂuence of the structure of the society on the size of the pension system (through the tax rate). This
tion is relaxed in Leroux and Pestieau (2010) where it is assumed either that individuals vote on the tax rate and that γ is optimally ﬁxed at a
tional level.
se cite this article as: Leroux, M.-L., et al., Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage, European Journal of Political Economy
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such as personal ones that we do not model here (like child bearing and rearing, etc.) but also on the pension design. Since this
decision is correlated with the form and the size of the pension rights given to the non-working spouse, which in turn depend also
on themarital and labour force structure of society (through the government budget constraint), for simplicity we assume that the
woman decision to work is exogenous and the segmentation between one- and two-breadwinner couples is ﬁxed.26
Let us ﬁrst explore the problem of a one-breadwinner couple, which is slightly different from the two-breadwinner one (i.e.













+ γπf + πm
 
p τð Þ≥2c + πf + πm
 
d
ðBÞOnly the man supplies labour, with lm =w(1−τ). Substituting for lm and πf, the indirect utility function is equal toVc1 τð Þ = 1−τð Þ
2w2
2
+ 1 + γβð Þπp τð Þ + 1 + βð Þπ u d 	−d ; ð6Þ
the superscript c1 stands for a couple with one breadwinner.where
The expression for p(τ) is now modiﬁed due to the existence of one-breadwinner couples. To see this clearly, we rewrite the
budget constraint asp π + βπ 1−φ + φμ + γφ 1−μð Þð Þ½ ≤τ wlm + αwlf 1−φ + φμð Þ
h i
:On the left-hand side we have total beneﬁts distributed: every working individual (men or women) receives a pension p and
the fraction φ(1−μ) of non-working women receive γp. On the right-hand side we have total contributions. In this model men
supply labour, whatever their marital status, but only womenwho are single or belong to two-breadwinner couples supply labour
and thus pay contributions. Using the optimal labour supplies, total contributions are equal to (1−τ)τ[1+α2(1−φ+φμ)]w2.
Then, the new expression for the ﬂat-rate pension beneﬁt is:p τð Þ = τ
1−τð Þ 1 + α2 1−φ + φμð Þ
h i
w2
1 + β 1−φ + φμ + γφ 1−μð Þð Þ½ π :Note that if we assume a society of only singles (φ=0), or a society with two-breadwinner couples (φ∈(0,1] and μ=1), p(τ)
is equal to Eq. (4) as before and we recover the solutions obtained in the previous subsections.
For the following sections, and in order to simplify notation, we deﬁne here the function χ(α,β,φ,μ,γ):χ α;β;φ; μ ;γð Þ = 1 + α
2 1−φ + φμð Þ
1 + β 1−φ + φμ + γφ 1−μð Þð Þ : ð7ÞThe “modiﬁed” pension beneﬁt can be rewritten asp τð Þ = τ 1−τð Þw
2
π
χ α;β;φ; μ;γð Þ: ð8Þ3.3.2. Preferred tax rates and the political equilibrium
Individuals preferred tax rates are obtained by solvingmax
τ∈ 0;1½ 
Vi τð Þ;
i accounts form (singlemale), f (single female), c2 (two-breadwinner couples) and c1 (one-breadwinner couples). For one-where
breadwinner couples, the indirect utility function is Eq. (6) while, for the other households, indirect utility functions remain the
same and given by Eqs. (2) and (5); only the expression for p(τ) is modiﬁed and given by Eq. (8). In Appendix B, we derive the
solution for each type of individual and show that the preferred tax rates are equal to:τm = 0 ð9Þe paper by Leroux and Pestieau (2010) the society comprises only couples, and the tax rate and the size of derived rights are chosen both through voting
he constitutional level. In that case the labour supply decision of the wife depends both on a housework cost and on the pension design (Bismarckian or
gean with derived pension rights).
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Plea
(201τf =
0 if γ N γˆf≡
β−α2
βα2φ 1−μð Þ
βχ α;β;φ; μ ;γð Þ−α2







β 1 + α2
 	
1 + βγð Þχ α;β;φ; μ ;γð Þ−1






1 + βð Þχ α;β;φ; μ;γð Þ− 1 + α2
 
2 1 + βð Þχ α;β;φ; μ ;γð Þ− 1 + α2 	 if γbγˆc
8><
>: ð12Þ
γˆf and γˆc are threshold levels of γ. Above γˆf single women prefer a zero tax and below γˆf they prefer a positive tax rate.where
Below γˆc, one-breadwinner couples prefer a zero tax and above γˆc, they prefer a positive tax rate. The threshold level for two-
breadwinner couples γˆc coincides with that of one-breadwinner couples, but the interests of these two types of households are
opposed, with two-breadwinner couples preferring a zero tax rate above γˆc and positive tax rates below γˆc. As before, the
preferred tax rates of single men are zero. Their preference for a zero tax rate is here reinforced by the fact that the pension system
now also redistributes towards one-breadwinner couples. For all other types of households, the level of preferred tax rate depends
on the value of γ (i.e. the level of generosity of the pension scheme towards one-breadwinner couples). Single women prefer a
strictly positive tax rate only when the system is not too generous towards the non-working spouse, since more redistribution to
the latter is to the detriment of single women (they get less from the pension scheme). For one-breadwinner couples, we obtain
the opposite: they will prefer a strictly positive tax rate if the scheme is sufﬁciently redistributive towards them. If γ→0, the
treatment one-breadwinner couples receive is similar to that of males. In this speciﬁc case, the couple obtains almost no survivor
or dependent beneﬁt compensation and they vote for a zero tax rate. On the contrary, if γ is high the husband's contribution to the
pension scheme can be compensated by the beneﬁt received by his non-working spouse. Two-breadwinner couples tend to prefer
zero tax rates unless the generosity of the system towards one-breadwinner couples is sufﬁciently low. In this case the fact that
both males and one-breadwinner couples are net contributors to the pension system can beneﬁt two-breadwinner couples and
they may vote for a positive tax despite its distortionary effects.
We now characterize the political equilibrium level of the tax rate. It depends on the generosity of the system towards one-
breadwinner couples (i.e. on the level of γ) and the composition of the population (and particularly on μ, i.e. the proportion of two-
breadwinner couples). Note that γˆcbγˆf (i.e., there is an interval where both τf







at γˆ∈ γˆc; γˆf
h i
. It is also possible to show that τfNτc2 within the interval where both are positive (i.e. 0bγbγˆc). This is notand th
surprising since single females beneﬁt from the pension system more than two-breadwinner couples regardless of the level of
generosity. We obtain the following cases (see Appendix B for details):
• For low levels of generosity γbγˆc, preferred tax rates are τm
 =τc1 =0,τc2 N0 and τfN0, with τf Nτc2 . If μb1/2, then τ=0. If μ N1/
2, then τ=τc2 N0.
• For medium levels of generosity γˆc b γ b γˆf , preferred tax rates are τm
 =τc2 =0, τc1 N0 and τfN0. If μ N1/2, then τ=0. If μ b1/2,
then τN0. However, the value of the tax rate depends on the particular value of γ with respect to γˆ(deﬁned above). If γˆcbγbγˆ,
the preferred tax rate is τc1 . If γˆbγ bγˆf , the preferred tax rate is τf
.
• Finally, for high levels of generosity γ N γˆf , only one-breadwinner couples vote for a positive tax rate, τc1
 N0, while all other
categories vote for a zero tax rate. Hence, a zero tax rate results unless φ(1−μ)N1/2 (i.e. the one-breadwinner couples form a
majority). In that highly unlikely case, τ=τc1 N0.
To sum up, the existence of one-earner couples (and their relative proportion 1−μ), as well as the generosity of the system
towards them (represented by γ), crucially inﬂuence the level of tax rate chosen by majority voting. A positive tax results for low
levels of generosity when the proportion of two-breadwinner couples is more than half and that they vote alongside singlewomen
against the interests of single men and one-breadwinner couples, which prefer a zero tax rate as these are net contributors to
the system. A positive tax results also for intermediate values of generosity when one-breadwinner couples represent a proportion
1−μN1/2 and vote alongside single women for a positive tax rate as they are both net recipients from the pension system.
However, the level of generosity needs to be relatively small so that single women still support it. If the level of generosity towardsse cite this article as: Leroux, M.-L., et al., Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage, European Journal of Political Economy
0), doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.10.001
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breadwinner couples represent a majority in the population, which is highly unlikely.
In the next section, we extend our model to take into account differences in productivity, not only between genders but also
across individuals in general.
4. Model with continuous productivity distribution
In this section we keep the assumption that longevity can take only two values (i.e. πm=π and πf=βπ for men and women,
respectively). In contrast, we now assume that productivity w is uniformly distributed with support [0,1]. The average and the
median productivity are thus identical and equal to w = wmed = 1 = 2.
27 Finally, we assume perfect assortative mating: when a
man and a woman form a couple they do so with someone with the same underlying productivity, which means wagesw and αw
for man and woman, respectively.28
With the results obtained above in mind, we expect that now every individual at the bottom of the wage distribution will be in
favour of a pension system, since they will beneﬁt from the inherent redistribution. Thus, independently of their marital status and
gender, a fraction of individuals (in each type of household) will vote for a positive tax rate. In contrast, some individuals, those at
the top of the wage distribution, will be against a pension system. In this section we study the relative support for a particular tax
rate within each type of household.
4.1. Preferred tax rates
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the w relates to the productivity of the individuals belonging to the different groups m, f, c2 and c1.could alternatively assume a right-skewed distribution, but this would complicate our model without providing additional insights.
e mentioned previously, independently of their (low or high) productivity, some women do not work, which is due to exogenous reasons or preferences,
e do not model here. This is certainly an interesting extension (see Leroux and Pestieau, 2010).
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In order to characterize the political equilibrium, we manipulate expressions (13) to (16) so as to obtain the productivity as a
function of the most preferred tax rate. With the uniform distribution assumption, this represents the proportion of individuals,
within each type of household, who prefer this tax rate (or a greater one) to any other lower tax rate:where
Plea




























wc1 τð Þ N wc2 τð Þ iff γ N
β−α2
β 1 + α2
 	 :We obtain three different patterns of support for a given tax rate τ:Case að Þ : γb β−α
2
β 1 + α2
 	→wm τð Þbwc1 τð Þbwc2 τð Þbwf τð Þ;
Case bð Þ : β−α
2
β 1 + α2
 	bγbβ−α2
βα2
→wm τð Þbwc2 τð Þbwc1 τð Þbwf τð Þ;
Case cð Þ : γ N β−α
2
βα2
→wm τð Þbwc2 τð Þbwf τð Þbwc1 τð Þ:In case (a), for low levels of generosity γ, support from single women is larger, followed by two-breadwinner couples, then
one-breadwinner couples and lastly single men. Note that at low levels of generosity the treatment of one-breadwinner couples is
similar to the treatment of single men and it is then not surprising that their interests are more aligned. As the system becomes
more generous towards one-breadwinner couples the pension system gains more support from this type of household than from
two-breadwinner couples. Note that the threshold level of γ that changes the pattern of support from case (a) to case (b) is
precisely the threshold level γˆc we identiﬁed in the single productivity case. Finally, if the pension system becomes too generous
towards one-breadwinner couples single women become less supportive. The threshold level of γ associated with a switch from
case (b) to case (c) is precisely the threshold level of γˆwe identiﬁed in the single productivity case.
We now turn to the characterization of the equilibrium payroll tax rate under majority voting. The equilibrium tax rate is
deﬁned such that at least one half of the population prefers this tax rate (or a higher one) to any other lower tax rate. The voting
equilibrium tax rate τ is then such that the number of individuals with higher productivity (and thus who would prefer a lower
tax rate) represents exactly one half of the total population:1−φð Þ wm τ
 	
+ wf τ
 	h i + 2φ μwc2 τ 	 + 1−μð Þwc1 τ 	  = 1; ð17Þ
a mass 1 of individuals corresponds to one half of the population. Solving the above equation (see Appendix C), we obtainwhere
that:τ =
χ α;β;φ; μ;γð ÞΩ α;β;φ; μ ;γð Þ2−3
2χ α;β;φ; μ ;γð ÞΩ α;β;φ; μ ;γð Þ2−3 ð18Þ














:We now illustrate this formula with a numerical example. We take as given α=0.8, β=1.2 and φ=0.6 and we focus on the
incidence of a variation in the proportion of two-breadwinner couples (μ) and in the generosity of the pension system (γ) on these cite this article as: Leroux, M.-L., et al., Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage, European Journal of Political Economy
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29 The values for α, β and φ are close to the ones observed in France. It is estimated that the pay gap between men and women within the same socio
professional category is around 19%, while the life expectancy at 60 of a woman is around 21% higher than the one of men. It is also the case that the division o
households between singles and couples is such that 59% of households are couples (See the website of the French national institute for economic studies and
statistics, www.insee.fr). As we mention in footnote 31, our results are robust to other (reasonable) speciﬁcations of α, β and φ.
30 We call it net support because in Ω(α,β,φ,μ,γ), wm(τ) does not appear.
31 Note that this result holds for any value μ∈ [0,1], φ∈ [0,1], γ∈ [0,1] and also when β increases. Only when α, which represents the proportion of productivity
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Fig. 2. Effect on the equilibrium tax rate of changes in the proportion of two-breadwinner couples and the size of derived pension rights.
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(2010), doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.10.001equilibrium tax rate.29 These changes relate to the two phenomena already mentioned: increasing labour participation of women
and individualization of pension systems. The results are reported in Fig. 2.
For any level of μb1, the equilibrium tax rate is increasing in γ (i.e. in the generosity towards one-breadwinner couples). The
analytical expression for ∂τ/∂γ (see Appendix C) depends on two effects: ∂χ(.)/∂γ and ∂Ω(.)/∂γ. The term χ(.) is a factor of
proportionality in the annual pension beneﬁts that stems from the budget constraint and is related to the ratio of contributions to
payments. We show that ∂χ(.)/∂γb0: an increase in γ, ceteris paribus, decreases the annual pension since a given amount of
contributions is shared among a larger proportion of individuals. The term Ω(.) stems from the net political support condition.30
We show that ∂Ω(.)/∂γN0. The combined effect, according to the expression for ∂τ/∂γ, is a priori ambiguous. We ﬁnd however a
condition for ∂τ/∂γN0 that depends exclusively on the parameters of the model. This analytical expression (in Appendix C)
allows us to carry out robustness checks on the numerical simulations. We are able to show that the condition holds for a large
range of reasonable parameter values.31 As the generosity towards one-breadwinner couples increases, and we move from case
(a) to case (c) characterized above, the pattern of support for the pension system changes, increasing among one-breadwinner
couples and decreasing among the rest. However, for the range of parameters investigated, the combined effect leads to a positive
effect of the size of derived pension rights on the equilibrium tax rate.
In contrast, the variation of the tax rate with μ (i.e. the number of two-breadwinner couples) is ambiguous and depends on the
level of γ. In Appendix C we provide the analytical expression for ∂τ/∂μ, which depends also on ∂χ(.)/∂μ and ∂Ω(.)/∂μ. The sign
of these expressions depends now on the value of γ: we show that ∂χ(.)/∂μN0 and ∂Ω(.)/∂μb0when γ N γˆc, whereas ∂χ(.)/∂μb0
and ∂Ω(.)/∂μN0 for γbγˆc. To understand the effect of μ on χ(.) note that the increase in the proportion of working spouses affects
both sides of the budget: as more married women work, the tax base increases (see footnote 23) but they also become eligible to
full pensions. The expenditure on derived pension rights diminishes as the proportion of non-working spouses decreases.
However, the relative importance of this effect depends on the level of generosity of the system: if γ is high, increasing the
proportion of working spouses substantially decreases the amount spent on derived pension rights, and the combined effect on
χ(.) is positive, whereas if γ is low the decrease in amount paid in derived pension rights and the increase in tax receipts are not
enough to compensate for the increased outlays in full pensions to working spouses, and the combined effect on χ(.) is negative.
To understand the effect of changes on μ onΩ(.), which is associated with the political support for the pension system, it is worth
recalling that wc1(τ)bwc2(τ) if and only if γbγˆc. This low level of generosity corresponds to case (a) described above where the
support for the pension system is primarily driven by single women and two-breadwinner couples. An increase in μ increases the
political support. On the contrary, γ N γˆc, corresponds to cases (b) and (c) where support for the pension scheme is increasingly
driven by one-breadwinner couples, the more so the larger γ is. Hence, an increase in μ, which decreases the proportion of one-
breadwinner couples, leads to a decrease in the political support. For the particular parameter values of α and β used, the threshold
value of generosity is γˆc = 0:2845. In our illustration it appears that the political support effect outweighs the budget effect: when-
f
12 M.-L. Leroux et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2010) xxx–xxxγb 0.2845 the tax rate increases with the proportion of two-breadwinner couples whereas when γN0.2845 we observe a decrease
in the equilibrium tax rate as the proportion of one-breadwinner couples decreases.
The effects of changes in γ and μ on the equilibrium tax rate, when both change simultaneously, may thus go in opposite
directions. Hence, it is a priori impossible to predict unambiguously the effect on the pension system of the recent trends towards
the increase in labour participation of married women and the individualization of pension rights. The model does however shed
light on the underlying forces, and particularly on the changing political support as those parameters vary.5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced two individuals' characteristics – gender and marital status differences – that are not
generally taken into account in political economy models of Social Security. Our analysis is one of the ﬁrst to shed light on the
importance of considering the couple as a distinct economic agent in order to explain the size of a pension system.32 As opposed to
standard political economymodels, which only consider single agents, we distinguish between single individuals, male or female,
and couples. We also distinguish between one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples and account for the existence of
derived pension rights.
We show that when there are only two wage levels (one for men and a lower one for women), only single men are always
against the pension system. On the contrary, all the other categories (i.e. one-, two-breadwinner couples and single women) may
favour it depending on the size of derived pension rights (i.e. the amount of redistribution one-breadwinner couples get from the
pension system). On the one hand, women and two-breadwinner couples beneﬁt from the redistribution operated by the pension
system because of advantageous longevity and wage heterogeneity; on the other hand, one-breadwinner couples beneﬁt from
redistribution through derived pension rights. Thus, if derived pension rights are high, the pension system is favourable to one-
breadwinner couples, but this is to the detriment of singlewomen and two-breadwinner couples whomay end up voting for a zero
tax. We also generalize our analysis by assuming a continuous productivity distribution. We ﬁnd that the equilibrium payroll tax
decreases when the system becomes less generous towards one-breadwinner couples but the effect of changes in the relative
number of two-breadwinner couples is found to be ambiguous.
Clearly, our paper shows that the marital status and the composition of households inﬂuence the political support for the
pension system. Moreover, another important observation of our paper is that, while two-breadwinner couples neutralize gender
differences in longevity and wage, one-breadwinner couples do not. If the pension system is generous towards the non-working
spouses, these couples will push for large pension beneﬁts. In that respect, it is worth noticing the current trend inmany countries:
the progressive decline in the proportion of couples with only one breadwinner and the individualization of pensions systems,
which implies less generosity towards non-working spouses. According to our model, an increasing individualisation of the
pension rights leads to a lower level of payroll taxation while the increasing number of two-breadwinner couples yields mitigated
results.33
In our paper we make a number of simplifying assumptions: no liquidity constraints, labour supply invariant to the marital
status, zero interest rate, actuarially fair annuity, nowidowers, quadratic disutility of labour, quasi-linear utility, uniform density of
wages, assortative mating and no overlapping generations. We do not think that the qualitative results would change if these
assumptions were relaxed; at the same time, it is clear that the analysis would be more complicated.
Finally, the type of pension system considered in this paper is the Beveridgean one: namely, a pension system wherein the
annual pension is invariant to contributions and longevity. This does not mean that everyone has the same resources upon
retirement. As public pensions are supplemented by private savings, it includes traditional savings but also all forms of deﬁned
contribution private pensions. An alternative speciﬁcation would be the traditional Bismarckian system (i.e. a pension system in
which beneﬁts are related to earnings but independent of longevity). A further possibility would be a pension system in which
pension beneﬁts are related to both longevity and contributions. Such a systemwould be akin to private savings. Themost realistic
speciﬁcation would probably include a mix of Beveridge and Bismarck with beneﬁts partially related to contributions, with
survival pension for spouses without or negligible pension rights, and minimum pensions.34
Another controversial aspect of our paper is that the level of derived pension rights is exogenously ﬁxed. One could expect this
to be a political choice variable. Assuming that individuals can vote both on the size of derived rights and on the tax rate level, but32 The closest paper to ours is Recoules (2009), which focuses on the political support for family-friendly policies (i.e. policies aimed at child-rearing) in a
society constituted only of couples and in which there is gender discrimination in the labour market. The degree of discrimination is likely to inﬂuence the size of
government spending, under some conditions.
33 There is a conjecture that the increasing participation of women in the labour market is accompanied by a decline in the level of wages. If this were the case
the wealth effect would disappear and we would then expect that the increase in the number of two-breadwinner couples would lead to an unambiguous
decrease in the equilibrium tax.
34 A more realistic setting would have been to look at a pension system that would be a linear combination between a (Beveridgean) ﬂat-rate beneﬁt pension
and a (Bismarckian) pension with beneﬁts that would be related to both earnings and longevity and without derived rights. Under our assumptions (quasi-linear
utility function and no liquidity constraints), the problem would be unchanged. The Bismarckian fraction would be identical to private saving and the vote would
only concern the Beveridgean fraction along with the given derived rights. If the pension consisted of only the Bismarckian part, then there would not be any
vote. Each individual would be indifferent between no pension and any level of Bismarckian pension, which would be neutralized by private saving.
Please cite this article as: Leroux, M.-L., et al., Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage, European Journal of Political Economy
(2010), doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.10.001
13M.-L. Leroux et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2010) xxx–xxxalso allowing the structure of the society to be endogenous (i.e. to depend on the pension instruments) would certainly constitute
an interesting extension.35
Our model could be extended in several other directions. First, we could investigate the implications of adjusting the couples'
pension beneﬁts for scale economies. Second, we have only considered differences in longevity between men and women but we
have not accounted for the empirical fact that men have, on average, longer life expectancy when married than when single. Our
conjecture is that, taking this second feature into account, would reinforce our results. The support for the pension system should
increase as then, not only a married man would gain from the beneﬁt received by his wife but also he would get beneﬁt from a
pension for a longer period than if he had been single.
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A. Preferred tax rate
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′(di)=1. Evaluating this expression at τ=0, we ﬁnd that any individual with w2i = πi≥E w2
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= π always prefers a zero tax with u
rate. For those with w2i = πi≥E w2 = π, the solution is interior and the preferred tax rate is equal to Eq. (3).
B. Model with unique productivity level
Indirect utility functions of the four categories of household areVf τð Þ = 1−τð Þ
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(τ) given by Eq. (8).with p
Preferred tax rates are characterized by differentiating the indirect utility functions with respect to τ:∂Vf τð Þ
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dτ
; ðB:4Þpaper by Leroux and Pestieau (2010) allows individuals to vote on the size of derived rights in a model where the structure of the society between one-
-breadwinner couples varies with the features of the model (such as the design of the pension system and a housework cost).
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(α,β,φ,μ,γ) deﬁned by Eq. (7).with χ
Evaluating ∂Vi(τ)/∂τ at τ=0, for i=m, f,c1,c2 we ﬁnd that∂Vm τð Þ
∂τ jτ=0b0;
∂Vf τð Þ
∂τ jτ=0b0 iff β−α2βα2φ 1−μð Þ bγ;
∂Vc1 τð Þ
∂τ jτ=0b0 iff γb β−α2β 1 + α2 	 ;
∂Vc1 τð Þ
∂τ jτ=0b0 iff γ N β−α2β 1 + α2 	 ;





φ 1−μð Þ ;
γˆc =
β−α2
β 1 + α2
 	 ;
hat for γbγˆf , the preferred tax rate of a single woman is positive (resp. if γ N γˆf , her preferred tax rate is zero), for γbγˆc thesuch t
preferred tax rate of a one-breadwinner couple is zero (resp. if γ N γˆc, the preferred tax rate is positive) and for γbγˆc the preferred
tax rate is positive (resp. if γ N γˆc, the preferred tax rate is zero). Thus, for γbγˆf , the preferred tax rate level of women is strictly
positive and solves the following equality:− 1−τð Þα2w2 + β 1−2τð Þχ α;β;φ; μ;γð Þw2 = 0:This yields Eq. (10). We use the same procedure for one-breadwinner couples when γˆc N γ and for two-breadwinner couples
when γbγˆc. The solutions are interior and yield Eqs. (11) and (12), respectively.
It is easy to show that γˆcbγˆf sinceβ−α2
β 1 + α2
 	b β−α2
βα2φ 1−μð Þ









. Finally, by comparing Eq. (10) and (12) we obtain that τfNτc2 .where
We then inspect all the possible coalitions for different values of γ. For instance, for low levels of generosity γbγˆc, preferred tax
rates are τm =τc1 =0,τc2 N0 and τfN0, with τfNτc2 . Positive tax rates result only if females and two-breadwinner couples form a
majority (i.e. 2φμ+(1−φ)N1, which simpliﬁes to μN1/2). In this case the smallest value of preferred tax rate τc2 is chosen
because in a pairwise comparison between the two positive preferred tax rates, single males and one-breadwinner couples will
vote for the smallest one.
C. Model with continuous productivity distribution
C.1. Preferred tax rates
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(201qs. (B.1), (B.2), (B.3) and (B.4), we obtain that
∂Vf τð Þ








χ α;β;φ; μ ;γð Þ−α2w2
:Using the same procedure for single men, we have that ∂Vm τð Þ=∂τ jτ=0b0 if 3w2Nχ(α,β,φ,μ,γ) so that in this case, τm =0,while
for 3w2bχ(α,β,φ,μ,γ), τm ∈ [0,1] and is equal to (21). For two-breadwinner couples,∂Vc2 τð Þ=∂τ jτ=0b0 if 3w2N(1+β)χ(α,β,φ,μ,γ)/
(1+α2); otherwise, it is equal to Eq. (14). For one-breadwinner couples, ∂Vc1 τð Þ=∂τ jτ=0b0 if 3w2N(1+γβ)χ(α,β,φ,μ,γ); otherwise
the solution is interior and equal to Eq. (15).
C.2. Equilibrium tax rate
Substituting the expressions for wf(τ), wc2(τ) and wc1(τ) into Eq. (17) we getwm τ















= 1:Denoting the term in brackets by Ω(α,β,φ,μ,γ), plugging the expression for wm(τ), and rearranging, we obtain Eq. (18).
C.3. Comparative statics
Using Eq. Eq. (18), we obtain that∂τ
∂γ =
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∂γ χ :ð Þ N 0:Note that a similar expression holds for any parameter. What matters is the particular expression for the effect of the particular
parameter on χ(.) and Ω(.) and what ﬁnal sign results when combined in the expression above.
We have that∂χ :ð Þ
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Combining in the expression above:∂χ :ð Þ
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1 + β 1−φ + φμ + γφ 1−μð Þð Þﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 + γβ
p NΩ :ð Þ
2
:This holds for reasonable values of μ, φ, γ∈ [0,1] and also when β increases. The only case in which the condition may not be
satisﬁed is for α≤0.4.
Using the same procedure for μ, we have that∂τ
∂μ N 0⇔
∂χ :ð Þ
∂μ Ω :ð Þ + 2
∂Ω :ð Þ
∂μ χ :ð Þ N 0;
∂χ :ð Þ
∂μ = φ
α2−β + βγ + α2βγ











:We can show that:∂χ :ð Þ
∂μ N 0⇔α




β 1 + α2





N 1 + γβ⇔γb
β−α2
β 1 + α2
 	 = γˆc:For β=1.2 and α=0.8, we obtain γˆc = 0.2845.
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